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Security in the Age of Terrorism

The American Security Project is sponsoring a continuing series of studies and events to examine the threat of Islamist extremism, assess the current approach to that struggle, and prescribe an innovative strategy for security in an age of terror.

Three initiatives comprise this project: the Origins Initiative, the Status Initiative, and the Strategy Initiative.

The Origins Initiative seeks to improve the public’s understanding of the sources and causes of extremism and violence. To be successful in defeating extremism, the country must understand its causes and its proponents' motivations in order to create sustainable, effective policies to keep America safe.  The results of this initiative are outlined in the report, "The Causes of Violent Jihadism."

The Status Initiative attempts to assess America’s progress in the struggle against radical Islamists over time. Counts of killed or captured Al Qaeda leaders alone do little to actually indicate whether U.S. policies are having a positive, lasting impact on terrorist actions or the violent jihadist movement. The Status Initiative examines multiple metrics for progress in the “war on terror.” The results of this initiative are outlined in the report, "Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against Violent Jihadism."

Finally, the Strategy Initiative will build on the work of the Origins and Status initiatives to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat extremists.

Project Report

  • Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against Violent Jihadism

    Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. foreign policy has focused largely on confronting the violent jihadist threat worldwide. There have been numerous successes and failures over the past six years in this so-called "war on terror."

    The American Security Project has developed ten criteria to measure progress – or lack of progress – in the struggle against violent jihadism. These metrics are designed to be both reproducible and as objective as possible. They are intended to comprise a holistic approach, examining causes and processes associated with violent jihadism, in addition to outcomes.

    On balance, these metrics indicate that the United States is not winning the "war on terror." The lack of measurable progress on most indices, the collapse of international public support for the United States, and the dramatic increase in jihadist violence since 2003 paint a bleak picture.

    I. Number of Terrorist Incidents
    There has been a massive and dramatic increase in Islamist terrorism since 2003. Terror attacks by Islamist extremist groups have increased significantly during this time, even when excluding attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, and those related to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

    II. Health of the Jihadist Movement
    The jihadist movement remains vibrant and dynamic. Early claims about disruption of the al Qaeda network were dramatically overstated. Only five of the twenty-two most wanted terrorists in 2001 have been captured or killed. Though some high ranking al Qaeda members have been eliminated, the organization has been able to promote or recruit members to replace losses.

    III. Al Qaeda Affiliated Movements
    Al Qaeda has expanded its reach globally by forging closer relationships with previously autonomous groups.

    IV. State Sponsorship of Terrorism
    Active state sponsorship of terrorism has diminished worldwide.

    V. Public Attitudes in the Muslim World
    U.S. foreign policy is perceived throughout the Muslim world as an aggressive, hostile and destabilizing force.

    VI. Public Attitudes in the United States
    American citizens remain very concerned about the terrorist threat. Significant numbers fear attacks on themselves or their family and friends. Increasing numbers of Americans believe the U.S. is losing the "war on terror."

    VII. Economic Prosperity and Political Freedom
    Broad measures of economic prosperity and political freedom show slow but steady improvement throughout most of the Muslim world.

    VIII. Ungoverned Spaces
    There has been minimal progress on reducing ungoverned spaces. Iraq and Afghanistan are no longer state sponsors of terrorism, but vast ungoverned areas within both of those states make them homes to vibrant jihadist movements that are less vulnerable to traditional instruments of statecraft.

    IX. International Cooperation Against Terrorists
    The number of countries committed to combating terrorism has increased since 9/11.

    X. Terrorist Financing
    International cooperation has led to some successes in curtailing terrorist financing, but there is no clear evidence that Islamist terror groups are being starved of resources. Trends in Afghan poppy production suggest a disturbing new source of terrorist financing.


  • The Causes of Violent Jihadism

    The United States is currently in a struggle against violent, self-described "jihadists" who have struck at the United States and U.S. interests across the globe.  In order to develop sound, workable and sustainable policy responses, we must understand both the nature and scope of the challenge. 

    This report examines the sources, causes and scope of the challenge posed by violent jihadism and offers broad conclusions that may be useful in developing more effective policy to address the global threat.

    The broad outlines of the conclusions are simple: there are multiple causes for violent jihadism and there are multiple communities that make up both the active and tacit elements of the movement.  Beyond those broad conclusions, however, there remain stunning gaps in our knowledge of the threat. In addition to making assessments about the challenge, this report highlights the issues that are sources of major debates in the research on jihadism and areas where the empirical record is too sparse to allow for any but the broadest of generalizations.

    Violent jihadism has three core causes:

    • a crisis of legitimacy in the Muslim world brought on by economic stagnation, population pressures, failures of political institutions and disputes over the interpretation of religious texts;
    • the foreign policies of the United States and other Western countries toward the Arab and Muslim worlds;
    • pathological dynamics within the Muslim world which promote beliefs in conspiracy theories, unsubstantiated rumors and anti-Semintism.

    In addition, a key finding of this report is that our jihadist enemies are not cynical manipulators of faith, but rather genuinely religious individuals whose interpretations of Islam are grounded in both scholarly interpretation and historical movements. Furthermore, they are respected by a significant percentage of the Muslim world.

    This study yields four important policy recommendations:

    • American public diplomacy efforts must be refocused from providing timely, clear governmental responses to the development of relationships with credible interlocutors who can communicate American values indirectly.
    • We need to develop better sources of knowledge about the social systems that support violent jihadism. There is a knowledge gap about the connections between mass beliefs and operational terror networks.
    • Our attempts to delegitimize violent jihadism by securing condemnations from mainstream clerics and governmental leaders only serves to reinforce the radicals' claims that these elites are tools of American imperialism.
    • We must be much more cautious about how we wade into theological disputes.

    This report is the first of three that examine how best to secure America in an age of terror. The second in this series, Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against Violent Jihadism, assesses how the United States is permorming in the "war on terror." The final report will lay out a comprehensive counter-terrorism and national security strategy.


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