CIA director says secret attacks in Pakistan have hobbled al-Qaeda – Washington Post

Those operations are seriously disrupting al-Qaeda. It’s pretty clear from all the intelligence we are getting that they are having a very difficult time putting together any kind of command and control, that they are scrambling. And that we really do have them on the run.

If targeted killings have knocked al-Qaeda off balance in the short term, so much the better. However, a strategy based primarily on using missile strikes to keep al-Qaeda on its toes and running forever is one that is not likely to prove sustainable in the long run. In addition to being costly in terms of resources and attention committed over time, an indefinite tactically-oriented kinetic approach (i.e. missile strikes) has the unfortunate potential consequence of generating civilian casualties that deepen resentment locally, regionally, and internationally. Though using missile strikes might be the best available option in the short term, over time this can make the flow of recruits and ideological sympathizers to AQ’s associated movements worldwide more difficult to effectively stem.

Panetta alludes to the fact that though AQ’s ability to conduct sophisticated, large-scale operations may have been significantly degraded, pressure on AQ has likely not eliminated the possibility of smaller-scale attacks conducted locally and abroad. This is largely because, since 9/11, al-Qaeda as an organization has decentralized and splintered to a certain extent, spawning a number of regional affiliate groups and individual terror cells that may in some cases draw inspiration from AQ central but, in general, plan and operate autonomously. Though some of these groups and individuals are active in Afghanistan and the parts of Pakistan where AQ’s core leadership is thought to be hiding, others are seeking refuge in some of the world’s many other ungoverned and poorly governed spaces, operating clandestinely within western countries, or both.

Some of these terror cells and groups have a primarily local or regional focus, and many of them have been trending more toward that direction in the past two years. Others, however, with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) being perhaps the prominent example, have demonstrated a willingness to conduct attacks outside of their base of operations against the U.S. and its allies. For some of these attacks, such as the failed Christmas Day bombing attack in late 2009 and Najibullah Zazi’s plot to bomb the New York City subway system, there is little evidence that AQ-affiliated groups and individuals obtained operational guidance from al-Qaeda’s core leadership.

Putting al-Qaeda’s core leadership on the run and its disrupting its ability to plan attacks on the U.S. and its allies clearly makes America safer and is a good thing. It is critically important, however, that one not confuse a tactical approach designed to disrupt al-Qaeda’s planning and operational capability in the short term with a strategy for defeating the organization, or the violent jihadism in general, in the long run.

Soaring IED attacks in Afghanistan stymie U.S. counteroffensive – washingtonpost.com

Taliban fighters more than doubled the number of homemade bombs they used against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan last year, relying on explosives that are often far more primitive than the ones used in Iraq.

This is a reminder of the poor information environment we’re operating in.  Remember how a couple of months ago we were treated to a series of articles about the increased sophistication of Afghan IEDs?  At that time, that was used (by Peter Bergen among others) to demonstrate that AQ was actively training the Taliban, and in turn that was used to justify the escalation in the country.

Now they are using more primitive IEDs.  What gives?

I don’t know the answer, but I think it is a reminder that we need to remain careful about inferring too much for individual pieces of tactical intelligence.  Inferred AQ/Taliban links from IED sophistication is a very dicey chain of logic, and certainly it should form the basis of national decisions one way or the other.

“JihadJane” said to have confessed – Philadelphia Enquirer

According to anonymous sources close to the investigation, Colleen LaRose, the 46-year-old American woman indicted for, among other things, plotting to kill Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks, confessed to the murder plot shortly following her arrest in October 2009. Despite this confession, and despite reportedly cooperating with the FBI, the self-titled “JihadJane” is still expected to plead not guilty. A not guilty plea would not prevent LaRose for accepting a negotiated plea agreement at a later date, it simply signals the beginning of formal legal proceedings. LaRose is scheduled to be arraigned today.

The results of a recent Gallup Poll confirm recent reports that the American public’s skepticism about the threat posed by global warming continues to increase.  This has been particularly true in the wake of the mistakes discovered within the IPCC’s 2007 report and “climategate.” Only 32 percent of Americans polled in March of this year believe global warming poses a serious threat to them in their lifetime.  This is down from a high of 40 percent in March of 2008.

At this time last year, Gallup asked Americans about the trade-off between the environment and the economy.  Fifty-one percent reported preference for pursuing economic growth over protecting the environment (42 percent).  It has become increasingly clear, however, that a trade-off may not in fact need to exist. These issues can and should be tackled using a “two birds, one stone” methodology.

Whether global temperatures increase by 3 degrees Celsius by 2025 or by 2050, investing in sustainable energies ensures America’s continued competitiveness in the global market.  Energy Secretary Steven Chu writes in his recent opinion piece:

Regardless of what the skeptics may think, there are indeed 20-dollar bills lying on the ground all around us. We only need the will — and the ways — to pick them up.

These $20 bills can be pocketed by Americans if we invest in 21^st century sustainable energy markets.  US economic recovery within both the private and the public sectors would be best advanced through the use of our resources to research and develop energy-efficient policies and technologies.

Writes Andrew Geshwiler, member of the Tennessee Business Leaders for a Clean Energy Economy,

Fact: Wind, solar and advanced batteries are all industries invented here in the U.S., but of the top 30 companies in the world in these industries, only six are American. We should strive for leadership in these industries…

Fact: China has 11 nuclear plants and 20 under construction, with plans for more. India has 18 nuclear plants, five under construction. The U.S. has not built a new nuclear power plant in more than 30 years.

Investing in sustainable, energy-efficient solutions guarantees American competitiveness in the global market.  As Geshwiler mentions in his op-ed, China continues to build is renewable energy capacity.  In particular, China has proven proficient in the development of wind-generated energy.  Staying competitive means the US must expand and deepen its involvement in this and similar sectors, As the Earth Policy Institute reports,

China is not stopping with wind. Although solar photovoltaics (PV) have thus far remained too costly for widespread deployment in the Chinese market, production for export has skyrocketed. Though its PV production before 2002 was near zero, by 2008 China had become the world’s number one producer.

Skepticism concerning global warming’s effects aside, our ability to grow and maintain the world’s most vibrant economy depends on our development of renewable energy technologies at home.  This is the surest way to remain competitive and to ensure a safer environment – two birds, one stone.

Al-Qaeda-linked New Jersey Man Sharif Mobley, arrested in Yemen, Worked in Nuclear Power Plants – NY Daily News

Sharif Mobley, a 26-year-old American native of Somali heritage, was arrested in Yemen this month in a roundup of suspected Al Qaeda members. He was being treated at a hospital in San’a [sic] when he killed one guard and wounded another in an escape attempt, officials said. Before Mobley moved to Yemen two years ago, ostensibly to learn Arabic and study the Koran, he worked for several contractors at three nuclear power plants in New Jersey from 2002 to 2008.

That Mobley worked at domestic nuclear facilities, that he is a natural-born US citizen, and that he led what was apparently a relatively unremarkable existence prior to his traveling to Yemen is likely to cause some significant consternation within the law-enforcement community and the American public. This is especially true given that the story comes on the heels of the “JihadJane” homegrown terrorism case brought to light on Wednesday. It will be interesting to see how the law-enforcement community and the American public react to these alleged “homegrown terrorist” arrests if they increase in frequency.

Beyond raising homeland security and domestic counterterrorism issues, this case also illustrates why and in what capacity US interest and engagement in Yemen has been increasing in recent months. Mobley is alleged to have ties to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemeni al-Qaeda affiliate that emerged in January 2009. This is the same group from whom Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, charged with perpetrating of the 2009 Christmas Day bombing attack, allegedly received training.

US government officials had recognized for some time prior to the Christmas Day attacks that al-Qaeda was resurgent in southern Yemen, and those officials had been providing aid to and increasing pressure on the Yemeni government to act against Yemeni terror cells. The US also took direct action against AQAP training camps in late 2009, launching missile strikes against suspected training camps north of Sana’a. Yemen’s military has also stepped up its attacks on AQAP installations, launching its own missile strikes and counterterrorism sweeps with increasing frequency.

Mobley’s arrest by itself will not likely have any direct effect on the level of US engagement in Yemen. In the medium term, however, a series of unsettling, high-profile arrests like these could be seen as justifying continued pressure on the Yemeni government to further restrict AQAP’s operational space or, potentially, more direct US action.

One must be careful when drawing conclusions from Mobley’s arrest and others like it. Though Mobley’s arrest is clearly a good thing if the charges are in fact valid, that arrest is not necessarily an implicit validation of the US-Yemeni pressure and pursue strategy. More arrests of US-born terror suspects in Yemen could be evidence that the joint US-Yemeni pressure on AQAP is working. On the other hand, it could also simply mean that that there are more terrorists to catch because, in spite of US-Yemeni efforts, AQAP terror cells are proliferating faster and its camps are drawing more recruits from the US and elsewhere.

This is not to say that increasing pressure on AQAP is not going to be a critical part of any solution aimed at reducing terrorist threats emanating from Yemen; increased pressure on AQAP from a variety of sources will likely be necessary to degrade its ability to conduct attacks domestically and abroad. However, a strategy aimed at preventing Yemen from becoming an al-Qaeda safe-haven and launching pad for attacks must take into consideration that counting terrorists captured or killed can be misleading; the true effect of kinetic operations and counterterrorism dragnets on terrorist group’s capability is difficult to objectively measure.

It bears mentioning that the missile strikes carried out shortly before the Christmas Day bombing attempt generated collateral damage that provided AQAP a public relations boost by allowing them to claim, however incredibly that the strikes motivated the airliner attack. Additionally part of the surprise of the Christmas Day bombing attempt was that AQAP was able to plan and launch the attack despite AQAP being under unprecedented pressure from US and Yemeni authorities. As the Washington Post notes,

The biggest surprise of the Christmas incident, a senior administration official said, was that planning for the attack and training of the alleged bomber, Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, took place in Yemen despite the fact that “we had that place sort of blanketed, that we were working it very closely.”

Missile strikes and police dragnets can be vital and effective tools for degrading a terrorist group’s operational ability and have the benefit of producing visible, tangible results. Reliance on arrests or bodycounts as a measure of a counterterrorism strategy’s effectiveness or as driver of policy, however, can prove counterproductive.

Before assuming that arrests or dead terrorist operatives are proof of either the efficacy of US-Yemeni counterterrorism efforts or of the need to increase US engagement in Yemen to prevent more US citizens being recruited and trained for attacks, we must assess all of their possible implications and potential repercussions. Interpreting counterterrorism successes and failures from multiple angles and refraining from jumping to conclusions can help us determine how use the tools at our disposal most judiciously in support of a more effective long-term strategy.

Mogadishu Residents Told to Leave Somali Capital – BBC

Mogadishu’s mayor has told residents to leave the Somali capital’s war zones, amid fierce battles with insurgents. Mayor Abdurisaq Mohamed Nor said the long-anticipated government offensive may start soon, so residents should withdraw at least 2km (1.25 miles)

It is questionable whether the US-backed Transitional Federal Government’s planned offensive will be able to push al-Shabaab and allied insurgent groups out of Mogadishu. The more interesting question, however, is how and whether the government plans to consolidate its gains if the offensive actually succeeds. Historically, the TFG has had significant difficulty holding territory, ceding it back to al-Shabaab and other militant groups sometimes mere hours after clearing it. One of the TFG’s major failings has also been its inability to provide basic services to Somalis, even in areas that it claims to control.

It is somewhat unlikely, therefore, that the TFG will be able to use a nominally successful offensive to make any real difference in terms of either the government’s level of influence vis-à-vis al-Shabaab or its standing as a legitimate governing authority in the eyes of Somalis. The offensive is also almost guaranteed to generate humanitarian emergencies to compound those that already exist, a fact that will make any attempt at legitimate governance even more difficult than it was before. An offensive generating widespread displacement and collateral damage could easily accelerate the TFG’s alienation from the Somali population, weakening it further as it tries to assert its strength.

Brought to U.S., Man Is Charged With Aiding Somali Terrorists – New York Times

This past Monday, Nigerian authorities sent Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed to the United States to face charges that he provided material support to al-Shabaab, the terrorist insurgent group fighting to overthrow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Ahmed is alleged to have received training from al-Shabaab and to have provided the group with approximately five thousand dollars.  The indictment also states that Ahmed was found in possession of bomb-making instructions in November 2009 and that he purchased a Kalashnikov rifle and two hand grenades.

Ahmed being tried in the US underscores the fact that Somalia and al-Shabaab have recently been looming large on the US counterterrorism radar. The US has demonstrated its intention to support the TFG in its effort take back Mogadishu, a significant step up from previous military and diplomatic support efforts, and has consistently escalated its criticism of and diplomatic action against Eritrea, who backs al-Shabaab in an effort to destabilize Ethiopia.

Trying alleged Shabaab supporters like Ahmed in US courts could be viewed as a symbolic supplement to a gradually coalescing counterterrorism strategy, a demonstration of America’s commitment to attack al-Shabaab and its support mechanisms on all fronts. It also highlights America’s willingness to work with its international partners, in this case Nigeria, to carry out that effort and pursue terrorists and their supporters through a variety of means wherever they operate.

That being said, however, the Ahmed case also showcases the limits inherent to any large-scale counterterrorism effort in which neither the US nor any viable local partner has a significant in-country presence or coercive capability. Ahmed’s arrest and prosecution are a reminder that training camps in Somalia’s south continue to operate relatively unimpeded, attracting both those seeking to carry out attacks against US-backed TFG and African Union forces in Somalia and foreign recruits who take their skills to conduct attacks abroad. In essence, Ahmed’s alleged activities are a symptom of a much larger problem that US and Somali authorities have shown little ability to solve.

To date, efforts to undermine al-Shabaab through public condemnation and diplomacy efforts, military proxy, targeted assassinations, and pressure on its state support networks have largely failed. To think that breaking al-Shabaab’s hold on southern Somalia can be achieved by prosecuting individuals allegedly supporting the group with four thousand dollars and a Kalashnikov, therefore, seems somewhat fanciful. Though targeting the individuals, terror cells, and funding networks that support al-Shabaab can be an important component of a broader counterterrorism strategy, those efforts must be coupled with a comprehensive policy that attacks the root of the problem more effectively in order to achieve results.

JihadJane, an American woman, faces terrorism charges – Washington Post

A petite, blond-haired, blue-eyed high school dropout who allegedly used the nickname JihadJane was identified Tuesday as an alleged terrorist intent on recruiting others to her cause.

The most obvious point here is that if profiling was ever an effective counterterrorism tool in the past, which is doubtful, it’s certainly safe to say that it is less of one now. “JihadJane” is not a confused and maladjusted youth, and she didn’t travel to Pakistan for radicalization or train in Somali terrorist camps. She isn’t a poorly integrated immigrant from the Arab world, a highly educated engineer frustrated with the lack of economic opportunity, in her thirties or below, or even male. This case highlights the fact that increased access to global communication networks essentially means that anyone, anywhere can be exposed to or even immersed in jihadist ideology and can gain access to jihadist communities around the world. Though it seems unlikely that counterterrorism officials will react by throwing out the profiling playbook altogether, this case clearly underlines profiling’s inherent limitations.

That being said, the law enforcement community and the American public should probably not take this case as an invitation to panic under the assumption that terrorists are hiding around every corner, posing as waitresses and soccer moms while planning global jihad. The Post article quotes J. Patrick Rowan, former chief of the Justice Department’s national security division,

If nothing else, it’s another reminder to the FBI of the obligation to run down every lead and every threat, because they can’t be too far-fetched.

In the long run taking this approach could be as counterproductive as relying on profiling measures or remaining generally complacent. Running down “every lead and every threat” is not only impossible, it also threatens to create other vulnerabilities by using up valuable resources and manpower chasing phantoms and rumors. The thought that homegrown terrorists can blend into mainstream society and plan attacks right under our noses is certainly a frightening one, and the FBI and other counterterrorism authorities should be commended for their work on this case and others like it. However, it is also important that we do not let occurrences such as this makes us more open to overreaction bred on paranoia and fear. Such overreaction would ultimately, over time, make us less secure.

While experts do not believe Iran has the intellectual capacity to manufacture the fuel rods required for its research reactor in Tehran as it claims is its aim, it is capable of making enough enriched uranium for a weapon “within six months or less,” states a March 3^rd report from the Institute for Science and International Security.  According to ISIS,

In a breakout scenario using low enriched uranium, Natanz could currently produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a weapon in six months or less.

How is this alarming rate possible?  Uranium enrichment is a nonlinear process, meaning the input required is not equivalent to the output.   Enriching higher grade uranium requires fewer centrifuges, of which Natanz alone houses 8,000.  Its capacity is as high as 54,000.

So far, Iran has enriched enough uranium 235 for two atomic bombs from its natural state of .7 percent to 4 percent.  This Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) is certainly shy of the 90 percent required for weapon-grade levels, but the process to get from .7 percent to 4 percent is more cumbersome than, for example, enriching it from 4 percent to 20.  Reports the New York Times,

A practical illustration of nonlinearity is that Iran — or any other nuclear hopeful — needs increasingly few centrifuges to make uranium 235 increasingly potent. For instance, one industry blueprint features 3,936 centrifuges for enriching up to 4 percent, 1,312 centrifuges to 20 percent, 546 centrifuges to 60 percent and just 128 centrifuges to 90 percent — the level needed for a bomb.

Iran has most recently received international attention for its decision to enrich its 4 percent stockpile to 20 percent.  Admittedly, an Obama administration official states, Iran ‘“is heading more and more in the direction of seeking a weapons capability.”’

But perhaps this decision to enrich its stockpile internally is a political maneuver, an effort to escalate tension between Iran and the West.  After all, experts point out, Iran is moving at a slow pace to create the fuel its reactor in Tehran depends on for power.  Despite the fact that the reactor’s fuel supply is likely to run out within months, at the current pace, it will be five to seven years before the adequate level is available.  Statements from the Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also signal political posturing,

‘We have opened a window of opportunity for the others to prove their political will to come and to have a deal on the nuclear fuel.’

Regardless, ISIS writes:

If Iran succeeds in producing a large stock of 19.75 percent LEU, in a worst-case scenario, the [Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant] is large enough to turn this LEU into sufficient weapon-grade uranium for a weapon within a month.

Bali Bomber Mastermind Dulmatin ‘Killed in Shoot-out’ – Timesonline

Dulmatin, a senior figure in the Southeast Asian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, was killed during a police counterterrorism raid in Pamulang today. Dulmatin, who participated in the Bali bombing in 2002, was a highly sought-after terror suspect and the third fugitive that Indonesian police have killed since 2005. Dulmatin was an explosives expert believed to have helped assemble and detonate the bombs used in the 2002 Bali attacks. He was the last of the Bali bombers to have evaded capture.